A book that divides its sections like Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophico demands careful reading. Furthermore, the book by Tiziana Andina entitled The Problem of Perception in Nietzsche Philosophy is prefaced by Maurizio Ferraris, who is the Director of a series of studies of The Laboratory for Ontology in Turin. Approaching Andina’s book, one realizes that it is a remarkable work, an important contribution to Nietzsche studies; this is because her scientific and philosophical knowl...

R. M. Friedberg demonstrated the existence of a recursive functional that agrees with no Banach-Mazur functional on the class of recursive functions. In this paper Friedberg's result is generalized to both α-recursive functionals and weak α-recursive functionals for all admissible ordinals α such that $\lambda , where α * is the Σ 1 -projectum of α and λ is the Σ 2 -cofinality of α. The theorem is also established for the metarecursive case, α = ω 1 , (...) where α * = λ = ω. (shrink)

Dans cet article, on soutient que Merleau-Ponty, à la fin de sa production philosophique, réhabilite ontologiquement le naturalisme caractéristique à la psychanalyse freudienne. Le philosophe identifie, dans le naturalisme articulé par Freud dans sa théorie, une description de la Nature qui, contrairement au subjectivisme philosophique des philosophies de la conscience, et aussi contrairement au mécanisme causal des sciences naturelles modernes, ne favorise pas une « image fantastique de l’homme, de l’esprit et de l’histoire » contraposée à l’inexorable existence d’une Nature (...) en soi. Ainsi, faire une « psychanalyse de la Nature », analyser les motifs de la réévaluation positive de la théorie freudienne dans les textes ultimes de Merleau-Ponty, implique faire ce qui a été l’intention du philosophe tout au long de la critique dirigée à la psychanalyse, c’est-à-dire : extraire de la théorie psychanalytique freudienne des conséquences philosophiques d’un certain ordre, ce que Freud n’a pas été capable de faire – et qui n’était pas non plus son but.In this article we maintain that at the end of his philosophical work, Merleau-Ponty ontologically rehabilitates the naturalism characteristic of Freudian psychoanalysis. In the naturalism articulated by Freud in his theoretical work, Merleau-Ponty identifies a description of Nature that, contrary to the subjectivism of philosophies of consciousness and also contrary to the mechanistic causality of the contemporary natural sciences, does not favor the “fantastic image of man, spirit and history,” counter-posed to the inexorable existence of Nature in itself. Consequently, to do a psychoanalysis of Nature, to analyze the motifs of a positive reevaluation of Freudian theory in Merleau-Ponty’s last works, implies fulfilling the intention he held all through his critique of psychoanalysis. That is to say, it implies extracting from Freudian psychoanalytic theory particular philosophical results, which Freud himself was not able to do—and which was not his aim.In questo articolo sosteniamo che Merleau-Ponty, al termine del suo percorso filosofico, arriva a riabilitare ontologicamente il naturalismo caratteristico della psicoanalisi freudiana. Il filosofo identifica nel naturalismo articolato da Freud una descrizione della Natura che, contrariamente al soggettivismo delle filosofie della coscienza, e, simmetricamente, al meccanicismo delle moderne scienze naturali, cessa di promuovere un’“immagine fantastica dell’uomo, dello spirito e della storia” contrapposta all’esistenza inesorabile di una Natura in sé. Così, svolgere l’idea di una “psicoanalisi della Natura”, e analizzare i motivi della rivalutazione della teoria freudiana negli ultimi testi di Merleau-Ponty, significa prolungare quella che è stata l’intenzione del filosofo lungo l’intero percorso della sua critica alla psicoanalisi: e cioè estrarre dalla teoria psicoanalitica freudiana conseguenze filosofiche appartenenti a un ordine che Freud non ha saputo raggiungere né si è dato il compito di raggiungere. (shrink)

In questo articolo i doni di cui Gerolamo ringrazia Eustochio e Marcella (epist. 31 e 44) sono riletti alla luce della tradizione classica dello scambio di regali, collegata specialmente ai Saturnalia: infatti, da un lato, essi trovano riscontro negli Xenia e negli Apohoreta di Marziale; dall’altro, Gerolamo, quando ne fornisce un’interpretazione, si conforma a un tipo di ricezione attiva del dono – una sua “decifrazione” –, che talora è attestata nella tradizione antica, specialmente saturnalizia (cfr. e.g. Petron. 56). In (...) termini più generali, Gerolamo realizza un’appropriazione cristiana dello scambio dei regali, offrendo un saggio di come la nuova “aristocrazia della fede”, da lui propugnata, non disdegni di rivivere i “riti” e l’etichetta propri delle élites, con l’intenzione sia di esserne legittimata agli occhi del mondo, sia – forse – di restituirli al loro significato vero. (shrink)

As a scientific, materialist worldview becomes increasingly difficult to repudiate, and as philosophers increasingly uncover and articulate the conceptual nature of morality and distinctively moral normativity, the threat of moral anti-realism becomes more and more real. This perspective is argued in Chapter One. Chapter Two discusses how laws and bioethical trends that pertain to the clinical management of patients in a vegetative coma differ from country to country and continue to give rise to unresolved legal debates and scientific controversy. Chapter (...) Three covers how caregivers in palliative care must be supported to better understand patients hopes and needs, making them comfortable to decide when or how much they want to eat. Chapter Four synthesises findings from four empirical studies conducted in Western Africa (Togo) on topics related to the autonomy (end of life decision-making among terminally-ill patients), benevolence and non-malevolence (breaking bad news to elderly patients and their families), and justice (informal payments to physicians, criminal prosecution in cases of HIV transmission) principles of bioethics. Finally, Chapter Five argues that expert members in Ethics committees have an unfair upper-hand, with their decisions trumping other debates in committee deliberations. Qualitative research is brought to bear which illustrates this and which also notes how expertise dilutes the training given to newly appointed ethics committee members. (shrink)

ArgumentFollowing an international trend, Italy has reformed its university system, especially concerning methods and tools for research evaluation, which are increasingly focused on a number of bibliometric indexes. To study the effects of these changes, we analyze the changing profiles of economists who have won competitions for full professorship in the last few decades in the country. We concentrate on individual characteristics and on scientific production. We show that the identification of a univocal and standardized concept of “research quality” within (...) the new research assessments has progressively imposed a strategy of “homologation,” especially for women. We find that women economists are at a higher risk of discrimination than their male colleagues and thus they are more likely to conform their research activities to the standardized profile imposed by the gender-blind application of simplistic bibliometric methods. (shrink)

Massimo Reichlin, Fondamenti di bioetica; Antonio D'Aloia, a cura di, La tempesta del Covid. Dimensioni bioetiche; Maria Zanichelli, a cura di, La persona come categoria bioetica. Prospettive umanistiche; Ferruccio Andolfi, a cura di, L'uomo e l'unico; Roberto Cipriani, L'incerta fede. Un'indagine quanti-qualitativa in Italia; Marcella D'Abbiero, Affetti privati, pubbliche virtù. La psiche come fattore politico.

Stephen Davies taught philosophy at the University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand. His research specialty is the philosophy of art. He is a former President of the American Society for Aesthetics. His books include Definitions of Art (Cornell UP, 1991), Musical Meaning and Expression (Cornell UP, 1994), Musical Works and Performances (Clarendon, 2001), Themes in the Philosophy of Music (OUP, 2003), Philosophical Perspectives on Art (OUP, 2007), Musical Understandings and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Music (OUP, 2011), The Artful (...) Species: Aesthetics, Art, and Evolution (OUP, 2012), The Philosophy of Art (Wiley-Blackwell, 2016 second ed.), and Adornment: What Self-decorations Tells Us about Who We Are, (Bloomsbury Academic, 2020). (shrink)

The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first (...) aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism. (shrink)

It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible (...) to reasons to act. Pragmatists who want to preserve a motivational constraint on reasons therefore have exactly two options: either arguing that there are irreducible reasons for being in non-intentional states ; or arguing that we can believe directly for practical reasons. I argue that the prospects for the former option are dim because irreducible reasons to be in states are hard to square with the motivational constraint on reasons. Returning to the more traditional route of arguing for pragmatism by defending a version of doxastic voluntarism therefore seems to be the more promising way for pragmatists to go. (shrink)

The semeiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce is irreducibly triadic, positing that a sign mediates between the object that determines it and the interpretant that it determines. He eventually holds that each sign has two objects and three interpretants, standardizing quickly on immediate and dynamical for the objects but experimenting with a variety of names for the interpretants. The two most prominent terminologies are immediate/dynamical/final and emotional/energetic/logical, and scholars have long debated how they are related to each other. This paper seeks (...) to shed new light on the matter by reviewing the numerous manuscript drafts where Peirce develops the latter nomenclature while attempting to introduce his pragmatism to a general audience. It then goes on to examine an additional set of interpretants, intentional/effectual/communicational, and shows that the three different trichotomies can be understood as complementary, rather than redundant or conflicting. (shrink)

Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can (...) make sense of blameworthiness for non-culpable attitudes. In response, voluntarists could propose a revision of our actual practices. This would lead us into a quite different debate. (shrink)

Aristotle often describes virtue in an idealized way, indicating that the virtuous person will never err or have a bad desire. Yet, drawing from empirical work on character and personality, many philosophers and psychologists believe that most people’s behavior stems from situational factors and that good behavior often stems from the wrong motives, such as maintaining a good mood or relieving feelings of guilt. Further, some suggest that the variability in most people’s behavior raises a challenge to traditional categories of (...) character such as virtue, vice, continence, and incontinence. Thus, it may seem impossible to develop virtue and that people lack character as Aristotle conceived of it. Drawing from Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Politics, I develop accounts of actual virtue and the character of ordinary people and respond to these two concerns. (shrink)

The globalism objection poses two distinct challenges to Aristotelian views of virtue. On the one hand, the consistency thesis demands that a virtue is behaviorally expressed in a wide range of trait-relevant situations. On the other hand, the evaluative integration thesis suggests that the presence of one virtue increases the probability of other, similar virtues, posing a problem for Aristotle’s reciprocity of the virtues thesis. I show that, by contrast to contemporary Aristotelian views and views attributed to Aristotle, Aristotle’s own (...) theory of virtue escapes the globalism objection. I address the consistency thesis by showing that each of Aristotle’s moral virtues are narrower than commonly assumed. I then address the evaluative integration thesis through a discussion of practical wisdom, showing that Aristotle believed one could fall short of perfect virtue, while still being fully virtuous. The upshot is that, despite idealizations of virtue throughout the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle held a realistic account of virtue, one that is different from contemporary Aristotelian views, and one that is empirically adequate insofar as it allows for more than a few virtuous people. (shrink)

Das Buch beschreibt die Transformation des Diskurses der Kulturwissenschaft, der seit seinem Entstehen um die Jahrhundertwende auch die deutsch-jüdische Interkulturalität retten sollte, in einem Diskurs der politischen Theologie (Carl Schmitt und Gerschom Scholem), über den sich der katastrophale Trennungsprozess beider Kulturen vollstreckt.

I present an explanatory argument for the reasons-first view: It is superior to knowledge-first views in particular in that it can both explain the specific epistemic role of perception and account for the shape and extent of epistemic justification.

This contribution contextualizes the relationship between fragility and education in the light of people’s changing conditions and perspectives, and their impact on educational processes, focusing in particular on the consequences of the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. By doing so, it introduces this focus, illustrates its coherence, and explains the basic methodological choice, namely the adoption of the Systematic Review, to explore different aspects of the relationship between fragility and education.

Sartre pädagogisch lesen, dies ist bislang versäumt worden. Zu entdecken ist in seinem Denken eine deutliche Nähe zum Bildungsbegriff des frühen Nietzsche und damit auch eine Akzentuierung der Selbstverantwortlichkeit des Subjekts gegenüber allen situativen Einschränkungen seiner Freiheit. In Zeiten einer drohenden Selbstabdankung des Subjekts ist die Anknüpfung an Sartres Verständnis der Authentizität hilfreich für das Bemühen um die Neuformulierung eines tragfähigen Bildungsbegriffs. Die Sportpädagogik gewinnt über Sartres Analysen des Körpers eine bis heute unerschlossene phänomenologische Perspektive auf ihre anthropologischen Grundlagen.

The article proposes looking at children's literature, particularly the form of the picture book, as an educational resource for producing body awareness in school. Eight reading steps for as many bodily actions aimed at naming the body, activating it, getting to know it and moving it in space, on and off the pages; between grounding, listening, breathing, playing and moving, the rediscovery of gestures and anatomical truths invites to deepen self-knowledge as a preliminary act to the encounter and relationship with (...) the other and with the environment. The picture books by their specificities of short form and cross-over, offer, even in non-fiction production, the possibility of bringing attention back to the body dimension within the school and educational debate, where it lives today in a state of malaise and oblivion. Meaningful conversations, explorations and relationships flow from the pages of the albums: research on language as a tool that gives dignity and value to each person, and encounters with the artistic representation of the world as an infinite mirror of its multiplicity and variety, constitute valuable opportunities for an education that is aware of the wholeness of learners and teachers and the integrated, erotic and embodied dimension of their relationship. (shrink)